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The subject of this working session is housing and consumer behav-
ior. As emphasized by John Muellbauer, one possible way in which 
house prices could influence consumer spending is through a hous-
ing collateral effect that is especially important for credit constrained 
households. While we keep in mind Professor Muellbauer’s work, I 
want to steer the conversation in a slightly different direction, to talk 
to you today about the role of risk premia in the U.S. housing market 
and the extent to which fluctuations in such premia might influence 
aggregate consumer spending. Indeed, the unprecedented surge in 
U.S. house prices that preceded the recent mortgage crisis appears, 
anecdotally, to have been driven by a decline in market participants’ 
assessment of the riskiness of these assets. Consider Chart 1.
Chart 1 plots the ratio of aggregate housing wealth to housing 
consumption, for the post-war period up through the end of 2006. 
Houses effectively pay dividends equal to the service flow from the 
durable housing stock; hence, this is a housing price-dividend ratio, 
denoted P/D in the chart. I have spotlighted the dramatic run-up in 
this ratio that began in the late 1990s. The picture is similar if we 
look at housing wealth relative to total (housing and nonhousing) 
consumption (Chart 2) or if we look at the price-dividend ratio from 
real estate investment trusts (REITs) securities (Chart 3). 
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Housing Wealth-Total Consumption Ratio
Chart 1
House Prices are High Relative to Housing Consumption
Source: NIPA and U.S. Flow of Funds
Source: NIPA ,U.S. Flow of Funds and author’s calculations
Chart 2
House Prices are High Relative to Total Consumption
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These charts convey two important empirical facts. One is that 
the big movements in housing wealth are really movements relative 
to measures of fundamental value. A second is that aggregate house 
prices—relative to virtually any indicator of fundamental value—
have reached unprecedented levels in the last ten years. As we’ll see, 
statistical evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of the variabil-
ity in these valuation ratios is attributable, historically, to movements 
in risk premia. 
Why concern ourselves with risk premia in this session on consum-
er behavior? I’ll make two points. First, movements in risk premia in 
the U.S. housing market are large and account for a substantial frac-
tion of variability in house prices relative to measures of fundamental 
value. Second, unlike the direct effects of credit market conditions, 
movements in risk premia in the aggregate housing market potential-
ly affect all homeowners, including unconstrained households who 
comprise a large fraction of aggregate consumption. By saying this, I 
do not mean to suggest that access to credit is a negligible factor in the 
consumption decisions of some households. I do suggest, however, 
that the direct effect of credit market conditions on broader aggregate 
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
Chart 3
Price-Dividend Ratio from REITs
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consumption may be smaller than the indirect effect that these condi-
tions could have on aggregate consumption via risk premia. 
Before elaborating on these points, let’s briefly review some other 
economic channels through which housing wealth might influence 
consumer spending. First, there might be a direct wealth effect: The 
more wealth people have (of any form) the more they consume. But 
as John Muellbauer points out, classic life-cycle consumption theory 
suggests that such a wealth effect should be small or even negative. 
Moreover, houses may merely provide a hedge against rent risk, and 
therefore fluctuations in house prices could have no real wealth ef-
fect (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). Second, house prices may also be 
correlated with consumer spending because of a common macroeco-
nomic factor (for example, income expectations) that affects both 
housing and consumption at the same time. Professor Muellbauer’s 
analysis explicitly controls for this possibility by including a measure 
of expected income growth in the empirical model for consumption. 
Third, housing wealth may be related to consumer spending because 
of a direct housing collateral effect. For households that are borrow-
ing constrained, an increase in house prices means a higher collateral 
value of their home, enabling them to borrow and spend more. 
This latter channel—what I’ll call the housing collateral channel—
forms the focus of John Muellbauer’s work. To my knowledge, this 
work provides one of the few empirical investigations of credit market 
conditions and aggregate consumer spending, and is therefore most 
welcome. Prior to considering this evidence, however, I find it useful 
to pause for a moment in order to muse on the theoretical basis for 
linking credit market conditions to broader aggregate consumption, 
keeping in mind the general equilibrium complications. For example, 
in some economic frameworks, such as in work by Hanno Lustig of 
the University of California, Los Angeles, and Stijn Van Nieuwer-
burgh of New York University (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2006, 
2007), fluctuations in housing collateral affect households’ ability to 
share risks with one another, and therefore affect the cross-sectional 
distribution of consumption, but do not affect the size of the overall 
consumption pie, or aggregate consumption. Movements in housing Commentary  339
collateral do affect risk premia in the housing market, however, which 
are linked to aggregate consumption. 
My reading of Professor Muellbauer’s results is in fact quite consis-
tent with a relatively modest role for credit market conditions in di-
rectly affecting broader aggregate consumption. Looking at his Tables 
2 and 3, we see that although the credit conditions index is found to 
be statistically significant in some regressions, measures of consumer 
credit conditions add little to the explained variation in quarterly ag-
gregate consumption growth. For example, in estimations on U.S. 
data, including measures of credit market conditions in the regression 
enables the empirical model to explain just 3.8% more of the quar-
terly variation in consumption growth than what can be explained by 
a benchmark specification that excludes these indicators. 
Both the benchmark specification in Professor Muellbauer’s study 
as well as the specifications including the credit conditions index 
contain a freely estimated stochastic trend to account for factors such 
as “demographic trends, evolutionary changes in the inequality of 
income and wealth and changes in social security and pensions sys-
tems, cohort-specific evolutionary shifts in attitudes in time prefer-
ences and risk, as well as long-term shifts in credit conditions.” While 
it is possible that changes in credit conditions have had an impor-
tant effect on consumption through their effect on this trend term, 
we cannot ascertain whether this is the case because it is impossible 
to identify the relative importance of the many potential economic 
forces that may have contributed to movements in a freely estimated 
stochastic trend. What we do observe from these results is that the 
direct effect of credit market conditions on broader aggregate con-
sumption appears to be small relative to the effect of other funda-
mental determinants, for example, the change in the unemployment 
rate and the log income-consumption ratio. 
With that, I want to return to the question of housing risk pre-
mia, and bring your attention to several more charts. From Chart 
1 we saw that up until about 1998, the housing price-dividend ra-
tio fluctuated within certain ranges. If we accept for the moment 
that housing valuation ratios will continue to fluctuate within their 
old historical ranges, then a high housing price-dividend ratio must   340  Sydney C. Ludvigson
foretell some combination of unusual increases in housing consump-
tion or decreases in housing prices in order to bring the ratio back in 
line with historical norms. 
So let’s look at those historical relationships. Chart 4 shows the rela-
tionship, in data up to 1998, between the log housing price-dividend 
ratio, on the horizontal axis, and the growth in housing consump-
tion three years ahead, on the vertical axis. It is clear from the cloud 
of data points in Chart 4 that there is no evidence of a statistically 
reliable relationship between these two variables. In fact, the slope of 
a fitted line is almost zero, but if anything is slightly negative, sug-
gesting that high price-dividend ratios forecast lower future housing 
consumption, not higher. High house prices do not forecast higher 
housing consumption. 
High house prices do forecast lower future house prices, however. 
Chart 5 shows that a high price-dividend ratio for the U.S. housing 
market is associated with slower and sometimes negative real housing 
wealth growth over a subsequent three-year horizon. 
How do we link these findings back to movements in risk premia? 
We just saw that high house prices do not forecast higher housing 
consumption. But one reason house prices could be high relative to 
housing consumption is that the rate at which future housing con-
sumption is discounted may have been driven down by unusually 
low risk premia. We can measure movements in risk premia in the 
housing market as forecastable movements in excess housing returns. 
The next two charts show that, historically, much of the variation in 
housing wealth relative to measures of fundamental value has been 
driven by movements in risk premia. 
Chart 6 shows the historical relationship between the price-dividend 
ratio for the U.S. housing market, on the horizontal axis, and the three-
year-ahead log housing return in excess of a short-term Treasury bill 
rate, on the vertical axis. The slope of a fitted line is negative and large 
in absolute value, indicating that a high price-dividend ratio forecasts 
sharply lower excess housing returns over the next three years. In fact, 
this simple relationship explains 56% of the three-year-ahead variation 
in the excess housing return. I should note that these findings are similar Commentary  341
Chart 4
Do High Price-Dividend Ratios Forecast Higher 
Housing Consumption?
Chart 5
Do Higher Price-Dividend Ratios 
Forecast House Price Growth?
Forecast Horizon: 3 Years
Slope -0.035
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Note: Historically, high P/D does not forecast high future dividends, D. What about future house prices, P?
Source: NIPA, U.S. Flow of Funds, 1952:Q1-1998:Q1, author’s calculations
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3-Year Growth 3-Year Growth
Note: Historically, high P/D forecasts lower house prices, P.
Source: NIPA, U.S. Flow of Funds, 1952:Q1-1998:Q1, author’s calculations342  Sydney C. Ludvigson
to those reported in a recent working paper by Federal Reserve Board 
economists Sean Campbell and coauthors (Campbell, Davis, Gallin 
and Martin, 2007). Similarly, Chart 7 shows that when the housing 
wealth-total consumption ratio is high (as recently, recall Chart 2), ex-
cess housing returns are again forecast to be sharply lower.  
Given that movements in risk premia constitute a quantitative-
ly important source of variability in the U.S. housing market, the 
question I would like to see addressed is whether such movements 
have any influence on aggregate consumer spending. This is an em-
pirical question; economic theory provides little guidance as to the 
magnitude of any such relation. In an initial attempt to answer this 
question, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of the Stern School of Business 
at NYU and I recently estimated a dynamic model of optimal con-
sumption choice that explicitly accounts for the role of risk-premia 
in asset markets. For your reference, the main features of this model 
and some empirical results are summarized in Exhibit A. 
Let me direct you to the empirical results in the table. The results 
suggest that changes in aggregate consumption are affected contem-
poraneously by fluctuations in housing risk premia, but modestly so. 
Such movements comprise an estimated 9.5% of the quarterly varia-
tion in aggregate consumption growth. Fluctuations in current and 
expected future labor income growth (human wealth), and, to a lesser 
Chart 6






3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6









































3-Year Log Excess Return 3-Year Log Excess Return
The housing P/D is high when risk premia are low.
Source: NIPA, U.S. Flow of Funds, 1952:Q1-1998:Q1, author’s calculationsCommentary  343
extent, current and expected future returns on financial assets, play a 
more important role in contemporaneous consumption decisions.
But it is important to distinguish the question of how fluctuations 
in housing risk premia may be related to contemporaneous consump-
tion, from the question of what, if anything, such fluctuations por-
tend about the future path of consumer spending. The last chart in 
your handout, Chart 8, shows the historical relationship between the 
log housing wealth-total consumption ratio, on the horizontal axis, 
and the growth in total aggregate consumption, three years ahead, on 
the vertical axis. There is little relationship between the two variables; 
the slope of a fitted line is close to zero. Thus, even though fluctua-
tions in housing risk premia may have some effect on contempora-
neous consumption, high house prices relative to total consumption 
contain little information about future consumer spending. 
Of course, these conclusions are based on historical relationships 
up to 1998. The important question going forward is whether the 
unusual behavior in the housing market since 1998 represents a 
break toward a fundamentally different long-run relationship be-
tween housing wealth and consumer spending, or whether it is sim-
ply a very large outlier, a more extreme version of a familiar historical 
pattern. It is too early to know, but at least the historical data give 
Chart 7
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Note: The housing wealth-consumption ratio is high when housing risk premia are low.
Source: NIPA, U.S. Flow of Funds, 1952:Q1-1998:Q1, author’s calculations344  Sydney C. Ludvigson
us some reason to expect that even a large decline in housing wealth 
may have only a modest impact on aggregate consumption, provided 
that such a decline does not have important spillover effects on other 
determinants of consumer spending.
I want to close my comments by making a general observation on 
the estimation of “wealth effects” in aggregate consumption data. Let 
lower case letters denote log variables, e.g., log Ct = ct. To estimate 
wealth effects, a typical empirical specification is a regression of log 
consumption, ct , on log housing wealth, ht , log nonhousing wealth, 
st  (including stock market wealth and other financial wealth), and 
log labor income, yt: 
ct=a+wsst+whht+wy  yt+ut.
For example, Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) estimate equations 
of this form for several countries. It is commonplace to use such 
specifications to estimate the relative wealth effects out of different 
forms of wealth (e.g., housing versus nonhousing wealth); that is to 
estimate differential “marginal propensities to consume” out of hous-
ing and nonhousing wealth. A larger coefficient on ht than on st is 
interpreted as a greater marginal propensity to consume out of hous-
ing wealth than nonhousing wealth. 
Chart 8
































3-Year Growth 3-Year Growth
Log Housing Wealth-Total Consumption Ratio
Slope -0.071
Adj Rsq = 5.6%
Note: High house prices relative total consumption contain little information about future consumption.
Source: NIPA, U.S. Flow of Funds, 1952:Q1-1998:Q1, author’s calculationsCommentary  345
In almost any representative agent model of consumer spending, 
however, a loglinear approximation of the household budget con-
straint implies an equation of the form above, in which the coeffi-
cients ws , wh  and wy have the interpretation of wealth shares, with ws 
the share of nonstockmarket wealth in aggregate (human and non-
human) wealth, wh the share of housing wealth in aggregate wealth 
and wy the share of human wealth in aggregate wealth (Lettau and 
Ludvigson, 2001). In addition, a first-order approximation of the 
budget constraint implies that log consumption, log wealth (housing 
and nonhousing) and log labor income are cointegrated, with the 
wealth shares ws , wh and wy equal to the cointegrating coefficients, 
which may be estimated from data. 
An advantage of this approach is that the estimated coefficients 
are superconsistent and therefore robust to regressor endogeneity in 
large samples. But because the estimated regression coefficients have 
the interpretation of wealth shares, they cannot be used to reveal 
the relative importance of housing versus nonhousing wealth in con-
sumption fluctuations. To see this, note that the marginal propensity 



















while the marginal propensity to consumption out of housing wealth 



















In U.S. data, housing wealth, Ht, comprises a larger fraction of 
household net worth than nonhousing wealth, St, thus the housing 
wealth share is larger than the nonhousing wealth share, wh >ws . At 
the same time, the consumption-nonhousing wealth ratio is neces-
sarily larger than the consumption-housing wealth ratio.  Ct /St > Ct /
Ht. It follows that marginal propensities to consume out of different 
forms of wealth may be similar even if wealth shares differ. Rath-
er than giving an indication of the relative importance of different 
forms of wealth in aggregate consumption fluctuations, regressions 346  Sydney C. Ludvigson
of the form above may merely tell us that housing wealth is a larger 
share of aggregate wealth than is stock market wealth. 
An alternative approach to estimating wealth effects, one more akin 
to that taken in Professor Muellbauer’s paper, is the Euler equation-
inspired methodology in which estimation is carried out in growth 
rates and/or ratios of variables. For example, the empirical specifica-
tions in Professor Muellbauer’s paper are regressions of consumption 
growth (log differences in consumption) on a variety of other variables, 
including measures of consumer credit conditions, which are plausibly 
covariance stationary. The regression coefficients in such specifications 
no longer have the interpretation of wealth shares, so we escape the 
difficulties with interpretation just discussed. But estimation in growth 
rates introduces a new set of difficulties: There is no longer reason to 
expect that the estimated coefficients will be robust to regressor endo-
geneity. The right-hand-side variables in these regressions are endog-
enous, and the estimated parameters may therefore fail to reveal the 
true empirical relationships that the researcher seeks to evaluate. Get-
ting around these difficulties may require a more structural approach 
to modeling and estimating the wealth effects on consumer spending. Commentary  347
Exhibit A: Model of Aggregate Consumption1:
•	 Optimizing	 households	 derive	 utility	 from	 nonhousing	 and	
housing consumption.
•	 Allows	 for	 changing	 expected	 returns	 (risk	 premia	 and	 short	
rates) on both housing wealth and financial wealth. 




°  Revisions in expected future returns to housing wealth, 
financial wealth, current and expected future labor in-
come (human wealth). 
°  Revisions in expected changes to the share of expenditure 




Fraction of variance in nonhousing consumption  
attributable to:
Current and expected future housing wealth returns (incl. risk premia) 9.5%
Current and expected future labor earnings (human wealth) 54%




Source: Sydney C. Ludvigson and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, New York University. 
 1Under complete markets, the relationship between aggregate consumption and 
returns can be represented by the preferences of a fictitious representative agent who 
can trade the aggregate housing return. The per-period utility function is a constant-
elasticity-of-consumption aggregator over housing and nonhousing consumption, 
while intertemporal preferences are modeled using the objective function proposed 348  Sydney C. Ludvigson
by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989). The model implies that the   
innovation in nonhousing consumption, c nh 
t+1, is given by 
































( ) ∑ ∑ ++ ∆st j 1 ,
where Et is the expectation operator, conditional on information at time t, the log 
return rt+1 is a portfolio weighted average of the returns on financial wealth, hous-
ing wealth, and current and expected future labor income (human wealth), st+1 is 
the log expenditure share on nonhousing consumption in total consumption, and 
s and e are preference parameters. A vector autoregression is used to estimate con-
ditional expectations, as in Campbell (1991). Commentary  349
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